Flirtation between Japan and NATO a cause for high vigilance of region: China Daily editorial
The arrival of envoys from NATO member states in Tokyo this week has been framed as "deepening partnership". Yet the choreography of this visit — three days of meetings, defense industry factory tours, and carefully worded communiques — betrays a more anxious subtext.
On paper, the agenda is straightforward. The envoys will meet Japanese officials, visit defense companies and discuss cooperation spanning technology, supply chains and regional security. But far from projecting unity and confident outreach, it exposes the strains within the transatlantic alliance and the uncertainties that have prompted the visit.
The evolution of the ties between Japan and NATO — from a "global partnership" to an "individually tailored program" — reflects a steady institutionalization of links. Tokyo has even sought participation in NATO's innovation platforms, signaling ambitions that go beyond symbolic alignment. Yet beneath this incremental deepening a more fundamental motivation has emerged: both sides are hedging against uncertainties emanating from Washington.
The timing is instructive. Recent frictions — ranging from the dispute over Greenland to divergent positions on Middle Eastern crises — have left relations between the United States and its NATO allies unusually brittle. The question quietly animating this Tokyo visit is no longer how NATO can expand eastward, but how it can protect itself against the unpredictability of its principal guarantor. In that sense, the delegation's reported interest in understanding how Japan manages US demands is telling.
But Japan's experience is hardly replicable. Since 1945, its security architecture, constitutional constraints and even elements of its economic order have been shaped under the aegis of US power. Arrangements such as the Plaza Accord and the broader postwar settlement embedded Japan deeply within a US-led system. This has delivered leased stability and taxed prosperity, both at the cost of a degree of strategic autonomy that NATO members — jealously protective of their sovereignty — would find difficult to emulate. If the NATO envoys are seeking a template, they may find instead a cautionary tale.
The economic dimension of this visit is equally revealing. NATO's interest in Japan's advanced manufacturing base reflects a growing desire among European allies to diversify defense supply chains. Roughly two-thirds of NATO's military production capacity still depends on the US. The search for alternatives has gained urgency as doubts about US reliability have crept into European strategic thinking. Japan, with its technological prowess and increasingly relaxed arms export policies, appears an attractive partner.
Yet this apparent complementarity masks structural constraints. Japan may possess the capacity to manufacture sophisticated systems, but lacks secure access to the inputs — energy and raw materials — required to sustain production at scale.
For Asia-Pacific countries, the implications are not trivial. NATO insists that it remains a "defensive" alliance, yet its outreach to the "Indo-Pacific" is viewed with wariness in the region. Even as NATO remains preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine, its soliciting of Japan signals an ambition to link the European and Asian theaters more closely. This was a theme already evident during the tenure of Jens Stoltenberg, who, as then head of the organization, drew explicit parallels between Ukraine and "Indo-Pacific" security. The current NATO chief appears, if anything, more inclined to reinforce these connections.
Japan's domestic trajectory adds another layer of complexity. Under its increasingly assertive right-wing leadership, Tokyo has moved to reinterpret its pacifist constraints and expand its military capabilities. Tokyo has championed a more robust militaristic posture, often couched in the language of "shared values" and "democratic resilience". For neighboring countries, the prospect of deeper NATO-Japan security integration raises uncomfortable questions about intent and consequences.
The alignment of narrow interests — Japan seeking "legitimacy" and markets for its military-industrial complex, NATO seeking diversification and technological collaboration — provides a strong impetus. But it does suggest that the relationship remains contingent on a broader strategic context that neither side fully controls, least of all the trajectory of US policy.
Whether this collusion produces a lasting partnership or merely a temporary alignment will depend, as ever, on forces far larger than the exchanges now unfolding in Tokyo.
































