This year’s Munich Security Conference did not signal the disintegration of the transatlantic alliance, but rather a new phase of evolution

This year, I was once again invited to attend the Munich Security Conference. My most immediate impression was not the debates surrounding any specific issue, but rather a pervasive sense of anxiety about the international order — felt both inside and outside the conference venue. Unlike last year’s conference, which revealed a noticeable “temperature gap” between Europe and the United States, the 2026 Munich Security Conference resembled a collective moment of uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations and the international order itself: Can Europe and the US still maintain strategic consensus? Is the US still willing to provide reliable security guarantees for Europe? And as multipolarity accelerates, where are transatlantic relations heading?

In corridor conversations, side events and evening exchanges, a growing consensus became increasingly clear: Transatlantic relations have not fractured, but their underlying logic is undergoing a profound change.

At the bilateral level, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech at this year’s conference struck a softer tone than that delivered last year by US Vice-President JD Vance. Rubio emphasized Washington’s desire to renew longstanding friendships with Europe and expressed support for a stronger Europe. Yet in substantive terms, the direction of US policy toward Europe has not changed.

Many European officials and scholars privately observed at the conference that the US’ dissatisfaction with Europe is no less pronounced than European grievances toward the US. Europe has long criticized US trade protectionism, technological restrictions and uncertainty surrounding US security commitments, while the US faults Europe for insufficient defense spending, declining industrial competitiveness, poorly managed migration policies and excessive reliance on Washington. Mutual dissatisfaction is gradually shifting from specific policy disputes to deeper strategic mistrust.

This trend is closely tied to evolving US perceptions of Europe in recent years. The current US administration has increasingly viewed the transatlantic relationship as a security arrangement whose costs and benefits can be calculated, rather than an institutional alliance grounded primarily in shared values. Rubio’s emphasis on the shared civilizational bond between the US and Europe — alongside a relative downplaying of common values — was widely interpreted by European participants as symbolic of this shift.

If bilateral dynamics reflect changes in alliance logic, the multilateral discussions at the Munich Security Conference more clearly revealed Europe’s broader concerns about the future of the international order. The 2026 Munich Security Report characterized today’s world as entering an era of “wrecking ball politics”, arguing that the existing international order is undergoing a process of dismantlement. This assessment resonated strongly across European strategic circles.

Conference discussions made clear that Europe’s anxiety about the future of the global order largely stems from uncertainty over the stability of transatlantic relations. The postwar liberal international order has long been jointly upheld by Europe and the US. As the US’ commitment to that order appears to be evolving, Europe increasingly worries that the system itself may become dysfunctional.

During the conference, European policymakers repeatedly raised a central question: Will the US continue to defend a rules-based international order, or will it increasingly prioritize sovereign competition and power politics? Behind this question lies a deeper uncertainty about the direction of US strategy. In this sense, the conference’s extensive focus on the international order was not merely a matter of agenda setting, but a reflection of European anxiety over the future of transatlantic relations.

At a deeper level, current changes in US-European relations result from the interaction of multiple factors.

First, the shift in US strategic priorities is reducing Europe’s relative importance within Washington’s global strategy. Whether in domestic industrial policy, strategic competition with China, or regional security affairs, the US’ strategic resources are increasingly concentrated on the Western Hemisphere and the “Indo-Pacific”.

Second, US perceptions of alliances are changing. The Trump administration has increasingly evaluated alliances through a cost-benefit framework, gradually transforming transatlantic relations from a community-based partnership into a form of conditional cooperation. As some European scholars noted, alliances are no longer identities but increasingly resemble contracts.

Third, a gap exists between Europe’s ambitions and its capabilities. While Europe seeks greater strategic autonomy, its defense capacity, political cohesion and industrial foundations remain insufficient to sustain an independent security role. This mismatch between goals and capabilities has intensified Europe’s anxiety about its dependence on the US.

Fourth, the Ukraine crisis and the evolving security environment have reinforced Europe’s reliance on US security guarantees while simultaneously heightening sensitivity to policy uncertainty in Washington. During conference discussions, European representatives widely agreed that any shift in US prioritization of the Ukraine issue would directly affect Europe’s security environment.

Observations from this year’s Munich conference suggest that a rupture in US-European relations is unlikely in the near term. Instead, the relationship is likely to exhibit a pattern of continued “drift”: Cooperation will persist, but the foundation of consensus is gradually changing.

On the one hand, the US still requires Europe as a security and geopolitical partner, and Europe continues to depend on US security support. NATO and the broader transatlantic security architecture retain strong institutional inertia. On the other hand, within the alliance, differences in perceptions of the international order, responsibilities and threats are widening. The US increasingly emphasizes sovereign competition and power politics, while Europe remains more inclined toward rules and multilateralism — a divergence likely to persist over the long term.

For China, changes in transatlantic relations mean both opportunities and constraints. As strategic uncertainty grows, Europe has stronger incentives to diversify external partnerships, creating potential space for cooperation with China in areas such as climate governance, the energy transition and global governance. However, European policy toward China remains heavily shaped by US security and technological frameworks. Even if transatlantic frictions intensify, Europe is unlikely to detach itself from the broader US strategic structure. Moreover, continued “drift” in US-European relations may heighten Europe’s strategic anxiety, leading to a more cautious — and at times ambivalent — China policy. China will therefore face a Europe that is more pluralistic and internally differentiated, rather than a unified strategic actor.

The picture of US-European relations presented at this year’s Munich Security Conference does not signal the disintegration of the alliance, but rather its entry into a new phase of evolution. In this phase, adjustments in US policy toward Europe will continue, European strategic anxiety will persist, and both sides will maintain cooperation within existing security and institutional frameworks. Transatlantic relations are gradually shifting from a traditional values-based community toward a more transactional and conditional partnership — a transformation that will shape not only US-European relations themselves but also the future configuration of the international order.

The author is a fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, and a member of Munich Young Leaders with the Munich Security Conference.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.